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In his new book, Eric Jones takes the interaction between economics and
culture seriously. He criticizes the culturalistic view that sees economic
processes embedded in and determined by culture (“cultural fixity”), and
he likewise discommends the economistic view that culture is a mere
reflection of economic forces, conveniently produced by economic incen-
tives and quickly adapting to economic necessities (“cultural nullity”).
He proposes instead that cultural and economic processes interact in an
irreducible way (“cultural reciprocity”).
The argument is strong, and both historians and economists will accept
the position – in theory. In practice, however, historians tend to empha-
size cultural explanation and adhere to cultural fixity, while economists
tend to disregard culture and favor cultural nullity. Jones succeeds in
nailing down the point that both have to give up the intellectual comfort
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of sticking to one or the other of these simple patterns when dealing with
longterm change. (For purposes of short-run analysis we may, of course,
fix both cultural and institutional features under a ceteris paribus clause,
but this will exclude analysis of institutional change, and of economic
change entailed by institutional change.)
The phenomena Jones is interested in are of central concern to institu-
tional analysis. As to the relationship between “culture” and “institu-
tions,” Jones (p. 109) notes:
Institutions and culture partly overlap. ... Culture consists
mainly of rules and practices learned fairly informally from
parents or the surrounding society. Institutions tend to be
conscious, even political, constructs including firms, trade
unions, building societies, banks, codified legal systems, or
other organized networks or sets of formal embodied rules.
Culture, though often able to bind, is relatively intangible;
institutions have a more rule-bound existence.
Seen this way, culture provides the underpinnings for institutions. Insti-
tutional economists should take notice.
The perspective is stunningly broad, comprising observations taken from
many regions and over many centuries. Jones (p. 257) emphasizes
rightly:
If the aim is to discover general principles by which culture
operates, it is unhelpful to have in mind merely one or two
faiths, one or two countries, or one or two centuries. Only a
wide range of examples and broad and long comparisons will
suffice.
This long perspective brings out the author’s vision very sharply. He
commences by outlining the issue. The recent “revival of cultural expla-
nation” usually takes the form of cultural relativism. Some time ago,
one of the last representatives of the German historical school put the
argument as follows:
Most economic phenomena are time-conditioned and are
rooted in specific geographical areas. They are subject to
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change over time and cannot be treated, therefore, with the
help of concepts and theorems purporting to be of universal
applicability. Economic theory can deal with those phenom-
ena only by differentiating patterns of economic life, patterns
which have come into being in the course of the historical
process. As a matter of fact, as many patterns must be delim-
ited as there are essential and typical differences in the basic
economic institutions. (Spiethoff, 1952, p.132).
Such a view would be a variant of what Jones terms “cultural fixity”:
It requires a different theory for each country and every region. Many
theorists who insist that “culture matters” argue along these lines. Jones
(p. 9) notes that, surprisingly, even many historians, who might be ex-
pected to emphasize cultural change, “likewise write as though cultures
are fixed and dominate other aspects of life, including economic life.”
This comes down to effectively eliminating history from the description
by replacing the unfolding stream of events with a set of self-contained
stills, and change is lost. As an upshot, this view entails plenty of am-
munition for critics of western democracy, human rights, and, generally,
enlightenment and rationality, and provides arguments for various forms
of religious fundamentalism or cultural protectionism. (It appears to me
that the opposite view of “cultural nullity” entails, politically speaking,
the same consequences, as it is obvious to noneconomists that culture
matters, and if a few economists deny the obvious, you can safely ignore
that, especially on taking into account that the prototype economist
appears dogmatic as a theorist, and inept as a forecaster – this quite in-
dependently of the relative theoretical merits of the approaches. Actually
the nullity view is much more refined and nuanced and better developed
theoretically than the fixity view: just think of authors like Marx and
Engels (1969) on the one hand, and Marshall (1920) on the other.)
Jones goes on and shows that cultures are both “fluid and sticky,” and
that a fixity position is as unsatisfactory as one of total malleability.
He is concerned with the “cultural fusion when markets coalesce and
competition starts between behavior and symbols that seldom came in
contact before” (p. 48), and he explains:
This use of the term ‘market’ may need to be elucidated. ...
Noneconomists associate markets with specific institutions. ...
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Instead of merely places where goods and services are sold
or exchanged, what is meant here by ‘market’ is any state of
competition between beliefs and ideas and forms of behavior.
(p. 48)
This position of “cultural reciprocity” emphasizes interaction of culture
and competition, culture and the market. Both are always in flux.
Some readers would think here that the evolutionary argument should
be invoked at this point in order to grasp the coevolution of culture
and economics, but Jones is rightly hesitant. He seems aware that the
social evolutionary argument (as developed by Marshall (1920) would
boil down to something close to cultural nullity. This is theoretically
fine and would also fit well with the tenor of Jones’s other writings, but
he knows better: He points to the many cases of lasting inefficiencies,
and to Hallpike’s (1987; 1996) (empirical) principle of the “survival of
the mediocre” rather than the “fittest.” This casts severe doubt on the
adaptive view and suggests strongly that cultures do have a (partial) life
of their own.
The book is about merging cultures, in the process of globalization. Sev-
eral avenues are discussed through which merging takes place. Language
is one of them, and language follows colonization and trade. Religion is
another. Jones (p. 94) emphasizes that “Christianity’s triumph was not
inevitable, since Islam, Judaism, even Mithraism were all in the market.”
He argues that the “high standards of behavior” of Christianity enabled
better cooperation. (This argument is difficult to defend empirically, as
the other religions could have served the same purpose. Yet I find it some-
what convincing in that it explains that one of those religions obtained
dominance, regardless of which. Note that Ensminger (1997) account of
the spreading of Islam along with trade substantiates a similar argument,
yet in her case with respect to Islam.) Other avenues discussed by Jones
relate to information and printing. I find the observation very telling that
the reformation, with its insistence on unfettered access to the Bible,
contributed much to the development of printing and the spreading of
ideas, thereby providing an infrastructure favorable to the diffusion of
knowledge, and supplying stuff for tinkerers and rationalists. In contrast,
Korea started much earlier, but with no success:
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The fifteenth-century King Sejong required his scholars to de-
vise an alphabet and writing system that would be easy for the
populace to learn, something more accessible than the Chinese
script in use among the literati. They invented a twenty-nine-
character syllabary called Han’gul, which linguists agree was
one of the greatest inventions ever made in the field of literacy.
Together with movable metal type, which Korea also possessed,
the stage was set for an explosion in popular literacy and a
dramatic increase in the availability of printed books.
Yet
Sejong died and the literati were quick to defend the investment
each of them had made in learning Chinese characters. They
squeezed Han-gul into an almost trivial role. (pp. 236f.)
These two cases illustrate nicely the point Jones wants to make: Cultural
and economic processes interact strongly and irreducibly. Literacy
hitchhiked on Protestantism, which emerged in opposition to the papacy
and carried unintended cultural consequences, working back on the
economy. In the Korean case, an instrumentally efficient solution for
promoting literacy was found, but was blocked by cultural monopolists
for reasons best analyzed in economic terms.
It is beyond the scope of this review to relate even briefly what Jones
has to say about cultures of immigration, east Asia’s experience with
modernization, and the cultural responses to economic change. The
general picture is “cultural reciprocity,” the irreducible interaction of
culture and economics. From this point of view he criticizes various
forms of protectionism – preserving languages that are close to extinct,
preserving culture by targeted subsidies, etc. All this, Jones argues,
tends to prevent change and betterment. Cultural protection leads, as
a rule, to stagnation, and the market is better equipped for creating
cultural innovation as well as progress.
This reviewer broadly agrees with Jones’s points in this respect, but
feels somewhat uneasy because the limits of “the market” are not clearly
delineated, yet the market requires a system of rules and behavior,
some cultural underpinning, and possibly, some cultural constraint.
5
Somehow it is argued that a business morality that abates fraud and
enhances transaction possibilities will emerge in markets if needed,
maybe through the success of a religion.Yet the many cases of the
survival of the mediocre, or even straight deterioration, must remain
enigmatic from such a perspective. What seems to be needed is more
detail about, as it were, the inner mechanics of the superstructure.
Further, cultural reciprocity presupposes that culture is not entirely re-
ducible to outside forces. Jones’s view seems to be that any culture, if left
alone, has the tendency to ossify and to stagnate. Hence competition be-
tween cultures and within cultures is needed to stir continuing cultural
change and progress. I would like to learn more about these culture-
internal forces in order to better understand the economics–culture in-
teraction. It cannot be pure inertia; ossification is something active, not
passive. The structuring force of Christianity is invoked as allowing im-
provements that were not achievable in the corresponding pre-Christian
settings. So if culture has the tendency to impose structure, this may
lead to ossification, but that is not entirely bad. Some cultural structure
may be better than none, even if stagnation is not the best state of affairs.
Societies may become not only too cold, but also too hot.
The book is beautifully written. It contains many perplexing stories and
thought-provoking observations, barring simple solutions. It is stunning
achievement by one of our leading literati.
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